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WHAT BOUNDARIES FOR THE EUROPEAN 
UNION AS A SECURITY ACTOR? 
 
 
 
Monica OPROIU* 
 
 
 Abstract. The European Union’s discourse as a security actor evolved after 2003 most 
spectacularly in its spatial dimension, determined by both internal developments of the EU and 
external ones of the security environment. As a security actor consecrated in the first decade of the years 
2000 by means of the European Security and Defense Policy and as a pacifying force on the European 
continent through the process of enlargement, the EU gradually aimed further and further, in order to 
stabilise states and regions, to promote a comprehensive concept of security and to protect its citizens, 
according to the dicton that „the first line of defense  starts abroad”.  Hence the continuous expansion 
of the geographical scope of both the EU’s representation as a security actor and of its actions This 
paper aims at exploring the discursive construction of the EU’s security identity, with a special focus on 
the geographical boundaries of the EU’s self-representation as an international security actor. 
 
Keywords: security, identity, European Security Strategy, European Security and Defense 
Policy, security frontier, geographical boundaries 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
According to the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the five objectives of the 
newly established (at that time) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
were the following: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union; to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways (my 
emphasis); to preserve peace and strengthen international security (my emphasis); to 
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promote international cooperation and to develop and consolidate democracy 
and the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (TEU, 
1992). As general and vague as they may be (Smith, 2008: 6), they mark the 
beginning of the European Union’s endeavours as a foreign policy actor, with a 
nascent security component which would later be developed through the 
European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). In addition to this, it is highly 
relevant to remind that the Saint-Malo Declaration of the French-British 
Summit – considered the impetus for setting-up the ESDP – stated that “The 
European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage”, meaning that the EU aimed at „having the capacity for 
autonomous action” in the fields of security and defence (Chaillot Paper 47, 
2001: 8). Gradually, the defence project of the EU focused mainly on the 
security component and developed capacities for both civilian and military crisis 
management which became operational in 2003. This enabled the EU to claim 
such roles as „security actor” or even “global player”, thus fueling the debate 
about EU’s nature as an international actor and its place on the world stage 
(White, 2004; Bretherton & Vogler, 2006). 
This paper aims at exploring the discursive construction of the EU’s 
security identity, with a special focus on the geographical boundaries of the 
EU’s self-representation as an international security actor. The analysis of the 
way in which the EU constructs its security identity through discourse is 
underpinned by the fact that the EU has included the promotion of peace and 
international security among its main objectives in foreign policy since 1992 (in 
the Maastricht Treaty) and since 1999 it has developed a security and defence 
component aimed at dealing with threats in the 21st Century.  
The main research questions of this essay were the following: Which are 
the geographical boundaries of the EU’s representation as a security actor? 
Where does the „security frontier” begin for Europe in performing threat 
management? How does the EU communicate this “security frontier”? 
The hypothesis of the paper is that the EU’s discourse as a security 
actor evolved after 2003 most spectacularly in its spatial component. This 
discourse was determined by both internal developments of the EU and 
external ones of the security environment, triggering the expansion of the 
geographical scope of both the EU’s representation as a security actor and of its 
actions. 
 
 
 1. Theoretical background 
  
 In the beginning of the ’90s, when a comprehensive concept of 
“security” emerged as an original contribution from Barry Buzan and the 
Copenhagen School, this amounted for a mini-revolution not only in the 
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theoretical and academic fields, but also in the practice of international relations 
and national security policy of the states. According to the primary definition 
provided by Barry Buzan, security (in international contexts) refers to “the 
capacity of states and societies to maintain an independent identity and their 
functional integrity” (Buzan, 2000: 30-31), while the categories of threats which 
could emerge were military, political, economic, societal and environ-         
ment-related. Consequently, in the post-Cold War era new elements were added 
to the discourse on security in Europe, such as: the environment, migration, 
ethnic conflicts, terrorism or organized crime (Buzan, Weaver, 2003: 356); 
without being absolutely new, they were acknowledged at that moment as the 
main security issues for the 21st Century. 
 The literature on the European Union and security is relatively rich and 
diverse, addressing issues such as the evolution of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy with its complementary European Security and Defense Policy 
(at present CSDP), the emerging strategic culture of the EU, including the 
adoption of a European Security Strategy, the nature of its                             
power – civilian/military – or the challenges faced by EU as a security actor and 
its need for a “grand strategy” (Cameron, 2007; Laidi, 2008; Howorth, 2007; 
Grevi, Helly & Keohane, 2009; Vennesson, 2007; Howorth, 2011). A recent 
strand of literature draws attention due to the complexity of the arguments and 
the “cultural turn” of the analysis, focusing on the discursive component of the 
EU’s security policy (Gariup, 2009). As the European Union is increasingly 
accused of not matching words with deeds or even worse - of substituting 
action by declarations - the discursive approach serves to better understand the 
most visible side of EU’s presence in world politics – its plethora of 
documents, strategies, discourses and declarations on CFSP/ESDP and the 
philosophy behind them.  
 On the other hand, a review of the existing scholarly work provides 
some authors with the conclusion that as rich and diverse as it might be, the 
literature on the EU a a security actor does not essentially keep up the pace 
with the comprehensive definition of security consecrated by Buzan, hence 
maintaining the field prisoner to a narrow quasiexclusive politico-military 
approach (Zwolski, 2009). Although it may be true, this “narrow” approach is 
somewhat justified by the fact that through the ESDP the EU has focused its 
actions on the hard security elements (mostly crisis management), while the 
more softer ones – such as tackling with climate change effects – remain 
underdeveloped for the moment. Nevertheless, the EU remains the only 
international actor/organization which promotes a comprehensive approach to 
security in general and to conflict in particular, benefitting from a wide 
“toolbox” that enables it to address conflicts, for example, from the prevention 
phase to post-conflict reconstruction and long-term development. In addition 
to this, the EU possesses highly developed mechanisms for humanitarian aid – 
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operated by the Commission – which provide relief for third countries (and 
member states, if necessary) in case of natural or man-made disasters, as part of 
the same comprehensive approach to security, which addresses both human 
security and the potential spill-over effects of instability.  
 Other authors reflect on the question of whether the EU is a security 
provider (an active actor) or a security consumer (passive actor) (Duna, 2010:  
20). Their conclusions point to the fact that throughout all its short history the 
EU benefitted from US security guarantees through NATO, which allowed it 
to develop as an island of peace and prosperity in a turbulent world – especially 
during the Cold War years, but in the years after the collapse of the USSR as 
well. And although the European States are still highly dependent on NATO 
and US military power – some would argue that this is actually the reason              
why – the European Union forged its own security and defense policy aiming at 
advancing a new approach to security and dealing with security concerns on the 
continent and beyond it. Dacian Dună credits the EU only with “being able, at 
best, to intervene in the final phases of conflict management, like peace-keeping 
or post-conflict recovery and reconstruction” (Duna, 2010: 20), whilst also 
acknowledging that once the economic crisis is over, the EU could advance 
towards acquiring the capabilities to intervene in the „whole spectrum of 
conflict management activities”. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty provided for a 
significant extension of the range of the so-called Petersberg tasks, from the 
higher to the lower end of conflict management, enabling the EU – at least 
from a legal point of view – to approach conflicts in any stage and in any part 
of the world. 
 This paper builds on the existing scholarly literature on the EU as a 
security actor and touches upon the discussion about identity in international 
relations, exploring the geographical representation of the EU’s “area of 
priviledged interests” as it emerges from the main documents in the security 
domain: the European Security Strategy (2003) and the Report on the 
implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008). 
 The discussion about identity has gradually gained great importance in 
the social sciences as it lies at the intersection of various fields of academic 
inquiry – social psychology, sociology, political sciences, etc. In International 
Relations the analysis of the national identity of a state or the ethnic and 
religious identity of a community proved extremely relevant. The unique 
features of the European Union as a locus of institutional socialization among 
states or sub-statal and trans-national structures determined the broadening of 
the discussion about identity, emphasizing the posibility for creating and 
transforming identities in supra-national contexts (Kryzanowski, 2010: 74). In 
European Studies, at least two strands of research are worth mentioning here: 
on the hand, the transformation of the member states’ national identity due to 
the input of EU institutions and policies (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003; 
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Graziano, Vink, 2007) and on the other hand, the cristalization of an identity of 
the European Union as a whole, by consecrating specific approaches, 
preferences and a common perception of “Europe”.  
 In this paper “identity” is understood as “the image of individuality and 
distinctiveness held and projected by an actor and formed through relations 
with significant others” (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996: 59). Karen 
Smith points to the fact that the EU’s policies, activities and                      
objectives – produced in a very complex policy-making environment where no 
one state or institution decisively shape the outcomes – help distinguish the EU 
both from each of its member states and from other international actors 
(Smith, 2008: 17), thus providing it with a specific identity. As identity is in fact 
a social discursive construct designed in specific historical or institutional 
contexts, it is useful to approach it by exploring its discursive dimension and 
the context that underpins its development. That is why this paper looks at the 
security identity of the European Union through the discursive geographical 
delineation of its security interests stated in its main policy documents of the 
field and at the context in which they were produced and communicated to the 
„significant others”.  
 
 
 2. Empirical material 
 
The empirical material to be used in the analysis consists of two EU 
official documents produced in the first decade of the years 2000 which can be 
considered essential for the EU’s approach to security in the post Cold War era: 
the EU Security Strategy (2003) and the Report on the Implementation of the 
Security Strategy (2008). The first document was drafted by the High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana and 
his team and adopted by the European Council in December 2003, in the 
aftermath of the US-led invasion in Iraq. The second document was adopted in 
December 2008, in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian War in August and 
was meant to assess the implementation of the EU Security Strategy of 2003 
and the new security environment after the forceful come-back of power 
politics in Europe. 
 The EU Security Strategy (2003) is a very complex document, depicting 
clearly and concisely the approach that the EU has towards security at the dawn 
of the 21st Century. In essence, it sets three core strategic objectives: addressing 
security threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, state failure, organized crime or a combination of all these); 
enhancing security in Europe’s neighbourhood and creating an international 
order based on „effective multilateralism” and the strengthening of the UN 
(Smith, 2008: 7). 
Monica OPROIU 
 
150 
 
 The Report on the Implementation of the Security Strategy (2008) is the 
longest and most complex text articulating the EU’s strategic approach to 
global affairs and was meant to become complementary to the 2003 Security 
Strategy, while assesing the EU’s achievements and shortcomings during the 
five years after the latter’s adoption. The main topics of the text are: the security 
challenges the EU was facing at that moment, the EU’s achievements in the 
field of security between 2003 - 2008, the international cooperation needed for 
counteracting this challenges and EU enlargement which altered significantly 
the strategic environment in Europe. 
 
 
 3. Context 
 
The context in which the European Union articulated a common 
discourse on security in the 21st Century has two dimensions – the first refers to 
the security environment of the first decade of the new millenium, marked by 
the terrorist attacks in the September 2001, while the second focuses on the 
internal evolution of the EU (both deepening and widening through 
institutional development and enlargement). The analysis covers the period 
from December 2003 to December 2008.  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the international 
security environment was transformed – from then onwards, the focus shifted 
to terrorism and failed states as the new challenges to the Western world. The 
Kosovo issue had barely come to an end two years before with NATO 
intervention on the ground in order to stop the violent repression of the 
Albanians in the Serb province; that war triggered a fierce debate about 
humanitarian interventions and drew once again the attention of the 
international community towards ethnic conflict in the Balkans. In 2001 the EU 
member states and the US were still slowly recovering from what had been a 
litmus test for NATO – the intervention in Kosovo - and turned their eyes to 
the Middle East, where the Second Intifada ravaged the Palestinian territories. 
The September 2001 terrorist atacks in the United States were singular 
due to the scale of the destruction, the boldness of the endeavour and the 
cruelty of the modus operandi. The enemy was soon identified and localized; the 
United States started a military campaign in Afghanistan in order to uproot the 
Taliban regime which had allowed al-Qaeda to transform the country into its 
training ground. Many EU member states joined this operation, while the 
international community acknowledged the entering in an era of new challenges 
and threats. The 2003 Iraq war was a decisive moment for the EU-US 
relationship: major European powers like Germany and France opposed the 
United States initiative of invading Iraq with the purpose of deposing Saddam 
Hussein. It was then that the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
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articulated the discourse on „Old Europe versus New Europe”, with the 
former questioning the United States endeavour in Iraq and the latter endorsing 
it and joining the „coallition of the willing”. 
What was surprising for many was that in the midst of the debate Old 
versus New Europe, the EU released in December 2003 its own Security 
Strategy which proved the determination of the member states to forge a 
common strategic culture by assessing jointly the threats the EU faced. The EU 
document thus represented a huge leap forward due to both its scope and 
content, but also to the timing of its release. Until 2008, the security 
environment in Europe and beyond was mainly shaped by the terrorist threat; 
the 2004/2005 attacks in Madrid and London proved that the threat was real 
and that terrorism had to be addressed with all available instruments. 
Homeland security took the forefront, but security concerns started further 
away from the national borders – in the Caucasus, in Africa and in the Middle 
East, anywhere the terrorists could train or set up cells. The wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq were draining the resources of the United States and of 
those European states engaged in them. Nevertheless, the European Union was 
entering the most flourishing period of its history which culminated in the huge 
enlargement waves of 2004-2007 and the Constitutional Project. 
The reform envisaged by the Nice Treaty signed in 2001 was only a 
temporary measure in view of the imminent EU enlargement; even before the 
Treaty was ratified, the EU had launched the process of debating on its future 
through the so-called European Convention. It all started with the Lacken 
Declaration on the Future of Europe in 2001 and in October 2004 the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed in Rome. The EU was 
moving at rapid pace – first it adopted its very own Security Strategy and then a 
Constitution. Moreover, in May 2004 the EU accession of eight former 
communist states from Central and Eastern Europe plus Cyprus and Malta 
became official. The Union now had 25 member states, soon to be joined by 
two others. In the mean time, the EU’s first military mission of crisis 
management was launched (in 2003) – hence the European Security and 
Defense Policy became operational, a new tool to be used for the EU’s 
endeavours as global player. In the summer of the 2005 the referenda in the 
Netherlands anf France failed to aprove the Constititional Treaty, triggering the 
end of the ratification process. A period of reflection followed, completed 
under the German Presidency in 2007, who pushed for the signing of the 
Lisbon Treaty meant to reform the EU and simplify its functioning. Romania 
and Bulgaria joined the club in January 2007, thus extending the borders of the 
EU further in Eastern Europe, to the Black Sea shores and former “limes” of 
the Soviet Union. 
As the ratification process of the Lisbon Treaty began, with the explicit 
purpose of streamlining the EU system and endow it with a unique and more 
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powerful voice in foreign affairs, in August 2008 the Russian-Georgian War 
offered the European Union the chance to match words with deeds. The return 
of violent conflict and conventional warfare in Europe triggered a prompt 
reaction of the EU, then under French Presidency. Nicolas Sarkozy mediated a 
cease-fire while the Russian troops were getting close to Tbilisi, the Georgian 
capital. An extraordinary European Council decided to send an EU monitoring 
mission to Georgia in order to oversee the observance of the cease-fire and the 
withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Georgian territory; the EU 
Monitoring Mission to Georgia became the fastest ever deployed ESDP 
mission and began its mandate in October 2008. By the end of 2008, as the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty faced the negative Irish referendum, while the 
EU had gained conficence from its concerted action in Georgia, the global 
financial crisis took the forefront. The economic hardships became the focus in 
Europe and all over the world, while security matters fell into the background. 
Nevertheless, an EU of 27 member states and a shaky process of internal 
reform held an ambition to make a difference in global affairs, both financial 
and security ones.  
 
 
 4. The geographical boundaries of the EU’s “grand strategy” 
 
 The European Security Strategy (ESS) was considered by some authors 
a foreign policy strategy and a statement of purpose in this area rather than a 
strategy listing all challenges the EU faced under the label of “security threats” 
(Biscop, Andersson, 2008: 12). For others, the ESS had all the ingredients of a 
“grand strategy” for the European Union, since it aimed at identifying European 
interests and intentions (shaping those of the member states as well) and at 
relating ends and means (Vennesson, 2007: 13). 
 Basically, what the ESS did was to assess the security                 
environment – highlighting a series of threats and challenges – and to set 
objectives for tackling them – according to the EU’s perspective on 
international relations and on the sources of insecurity/instability (bad 
governance, state failure, regional conflicts). But what is interesting is how the 
EU defines itself as a force for good in the world, together with the United 
States, but especially on the continent, where it emphasizes the direct link 
between its enlargement and the promotion of peace. Hence, the ESS states 
that “successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and 
peaceful continent (ESS, 2003)”. Although focused on the continent, the EU 
„inevitably” performs as a global player as well, due to its capacity of projecting 
force at great distance with the aim of ensuring security for all. It is at this point 
that the ESS highlights for the first time the geographical areas where the the 
EU can and did act: „In the last decade European forces have been deployed 
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abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC” (ESS, 
2003). Consequently, the Balkans are no longer the limes of Europe1. 
Nevertheless, they remain an issue of concern and a reminder that „war has not 
disappeared from our continent” (ESS, 2003).  
 Among the main threats listed by the document (terrorism, WMD 
proliferation, organised crime and to a certain extent state failure), the regional 
conflicts are the only ones with a precise geographical location - in Kashmir, 
the Great Lakes Region, the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East. Although 
in this part of the document only a few of the regional conflicts which can 
„impact on European interests directly and indirectly” (ESS, 2003: 6) are 
mentioned (those in the South Caucasus and Transnistria notably being absent), 
they represent the geographical benchmarks of the EU’s strategic perception. In 
other words, it is in this regions that the EU’s security or insecurity (understood 
as a perception, not necessarily a as fact) begins. That is why it is puzzling that 
Afghanistan and Central Asia are not explicitly included in this section, whilst 
there is a reference to the Korean Peninsula and remains unclear what direct 
European interests are present there (Gariup, 2009: 174). 
 Further on in the document, it is stated clearly that “in an era of 
globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at 
hand”, providing the justification for the expansion of the EU’s strategic 
horizons. This argument is taken a step further when stating that “with the new 
threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad” (ESS, 2003: 7); this marks 
a clear separation from the Cold War era, when the biggest threat – that of 
invasion by Soviet troops – originated from within Europe and even a 
distancing from the imediat post-Cold War period of the ’90s when the threat 
of instability and spillover of violence came from the Balkans. By arguing that 
the EU perceives threats at strategic distance, the ESS implicitly (and explicitly 
in the first page, as shown before) underpins the EU’s ambitions as a global 
security actor, expressed both through discourse and practice. The latter mainly 
refers to the EU missions under the ESDP and the EU member states 
involvment in the war in Afghanistan. Although limited in scope and actual 
number of troops (with the exception of ISAF in Afghanistan), these ESDP 
military operations gradually consecrated the EU as a global player, which can 
deploy troops from Afghanistan to East Timor in Indonesia and DRC in 
Africa. Nevertheless, the EU maintains focus on its imediate neighbourhood as 
well, admitting that „even in an era of globalisation, geography is still 
important” (ESS, 2003: 7). Consequently, defence may start abroad, but the 
strategic priority remains the close vicinity, where security and good governance 
                                                          
1 In the 2001 EU Programme on the Prevention of Violent Conflict, the Balkans were 
the only geographical area mentioned as a matter of concerrn and focus of the EU’s 
efforts for conflict prevention in Europe. 
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go hand in hand: „it is in the European interest that countries on our borders 
are well-governed” (ESS, 2003: 7).  
 Many scholars have debated the EU’s promotion of security as a global 
public good (GPG), which links security with good governance and democracy 
and explained it by a generous vision of the EU about international relations, 
based on liberal values entitling the EU to the label of „positive power” 
(Vennesson, 2007: 15-16; Biscop, 2010: 74-75). The EU as a normative power 
debate is beyond the scope of this paper, but that approach was worth 
mentioning because it emphasized the EU’s original concept of security (and 
implicitly of the threats to it) which determines a policy line with certain 
geographical implications. It is only in the section dedicated to the 
neighbourhood that the ESS mentions the conflict in the South Caucasus and it 
does so euphemistically, as „the problems in the South Caucasus”  which „will 
in due course also be a neighbouring region” (ESS, 2003: 8). The situation will 
change dramatically with the Russian-Georgian War of August 2008, as will be 
seen in the Report on the Implementation of the ESS.  
 Other neighbouring areas of concern for the EU were in 2003 the 
Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediteranean area, while the 
Moldovan/Transnistriean issue is not even mentioned and Russia is presented 
only as an actor helping to stabilize the Balkans and possibly the Middle East. 
This can be explained by the fact that the ESS was launched before the 2004 
enlargement which altered significantly the strategic landscape on the continent 
(together with NATO’s enlargement in 2004) and before Russia’s military 
intervention in Georgia. 
 As shown in the previous chapter, the Report on the Implementation of 
the ESS was released in 2008 in an extremely tense international and European 
context and was meant from the beginning to complement – not to            
replace – the original ESS as consensus on a new security strategy was no 
longer reached.  
 The 2008 document built on the EU’s remarkable achievements of the 
five years that had passed since the original document – the two-wave 
enlargement in Central and South-East Europe, the continuous development of 
the ESDP and the reformed agreed in Lisbon in 2007. In addition to this, it 
acknowledged the return of war to Europe in the aftermath of the Russian-
Georgian War of August, for which the French Presidency managed to 
successfully negociate a cease-fire. As the strategic outlook changed, the EU 
became more and more aware of, and explicit about, it’s global role and unique 
mission: “Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the 
European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history. 
The EU remains an anchor of stability” (Report, 2008: 1).  
 Consequently, the geographical boundaries of its strategic interests had 
continually expanded and so did the range of instruments it developed to 
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address them – from the Neighbourhood Policy to the ESDP and the more 
targeted ones like the Union for the Mediteranean or the Eastern Partnership. 
Nevertheless, achievements start close to home and the Report proudly states 
that „The Balkans are changing for the better” (Report, 2008: 2).  But the term 
„the Balkans” designates here more than a geographical area: it refers to a 
category of actors with a certain impact on EU history and a significant role in 
its imaginarium of conflict and security. The report acknowledges an 
improvement of the situation in the Balkans, but naming neither the countries 
in the region, nor the wars that shattered them fifteen years before. Hence it 
can be argued that the term refers to a specific phenomenon (ethnic wars in the 
EU’s neighbourhood to which it reacted chaotically back in the ’90s) more than 
to a geographical area.  
 Moreover, in the 2008 document new actors are mentioned – Iran and 
China – in order to depict two emerging trends – a negative one endangering 
the non-proliferation system and a positive one pertaining to the benefits of 
globalisation such as the reduction of poverty (Report, 2008).  
 Further on, two dimensions of the evolution of ESDP were    
highlighted - both its geographical one and the diversity of mission typology: 
the EU’s action as a crisis manager stretches from Aceh, Indonesia to Chad and 
is as diverse as peace-building and protecting refugees (Report, 2008). The 
achievements of the ESDP are a result of “a distinctive approach to foreign and 
security policy”, which consecrates the EU as a reliable global security actor and 
feeds the high expectations of its citizens. Consequently, the EU sets for itself 
the goal of becoming “more strategic” in its vision, together with that of a 
higher efficiency and visibility “around the world”. Some authors found it 
disapointing that the Report “makes no effort to outline what these laudable 
ambitions might require or how they could be achieved” (Howorth, 2009: 16), 
arguing that this type of approach should not continue as the EU really needs a 
“grand strategy”. 
 The other pillar of stabilisation is enlargement, but it can only be used 
on the European continent, with a focus on Turkey and the Balkans. Again, the 
great challenge is posed by regional conflicts in the EU’s vicinity, the more so 
because the enlargement process has brought it closer to new areas of          
concern – Moldova and Georgia – in addition to the traditional one in the 
Middle East, hosting the Arab-Israeli protracted conflict.  
 The Report reiterates that “Europe has security interests beyond its 
immediate neighbourhood” (Report, 2008: 17), naming Afghanistan as the main 
example. It is here that the security of the EU actually begins and where its 
number one commitment lies. In addition to this, the EU can focus on more 
and more remote regions because it is expected to act and is endowed with the 
necessary capabilities to do it.  
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 Conclusions 
 
 The discursive analysis of the EU’s two main documents in the field of 
security reveals a spectacular evolution of the geographical stretch of the 
European Union’s strategic horizons and „playground”. As a security actor 
consecrated in the first decade of the years 2000 through ESDP and a pacifying 
force on the European continent through the process of enlargement, the EU 
gradually aimed further and further, in order to stabilise states and regions, to 
promote a comprehensive concept of security and to protect its citizens, 
according to the dicton that „the first line of defense often starts abroad”. Both 
strategic vision and humanitarian concerns guide the EU in approaching 
regional conflicts or dealing with instability. In the Balkans and Afghanistan the 
EU struggles with institution-building and even state-building; in its immediate 
neighbourhood it promotes good governance; in the Middle East it supports 
the difficult peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians; in Africa it 
performs crisis management, while also keeping an eye on the conflicts in 
Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula. Geography may not be everything, but it 
remains the most important starting point even (or the more so) in a globalized 
world.  
 As a global player, the entire world should be a playground for the 
European Union. But in reality the EU has a limited capacity to project force 
and even to exercise soft power. Neverthless, its security perception has very wide 
boundaries. So does its discursive representation as a security actor: from the 
Balkans to Iran, Indonesia and the Middle East. Threat management begins 
close to home, but it can stretch as far as 10 000 km from Brussels (taken as the 
central point of the radius in strategic planning for ESDP) (Gariup, 2009: 174). 
Altough this cannot be interpreted as a political commitment, it accounts for 
the geographical range of potential action and defines the EU’s discourse in 
security policy. And this boundaries are openly stated in EU hallmark 
documents – the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the ESS – designed for both internal use and external 
audiences. There’s openess, transparency and determination in shaping and 
communicating the EU’s security identity through official discourse. The 
European Union may not be a fully-fledged global player yet, but it remains 
honest concerning its ambitions and works continually for extending and 
improving the geographical reach of its action as a “force for good”.  
What Boundaries for the European Union as a Security Actor? 
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